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INTRODUCTION 
American states and municipalities have 
provided private companies with economic 
development incentives -- property tax 
abatements, low-interest loans, grants for 
expansion -- since this country’s inception.  
Over the last twenty years the practice has 
grown exponentially, and with this growth 
has come more complex public financing 
instruments like Tax Increment Financing 
(TIF).  Today, it is safe to say that every city, 
county, and state offers some kind of 
incentive to prospective and existing 
businesses.  The average state provides 
more than 30 different kinds of economic 
development subsidies, many of which are 
administered by local or regional bodies. 
With this growth has also come heavy 
criticism from taxpayers accusing the public 
sector of giving away too much for too 
little.  Total state and local spending for 
jobs is now estimated at more than $50 
billion a year.1  In the Time magazine cover 
story entitled “What Corporate Welfare 
Costs” the authors found that federal, state 
and local incentives cost “every working 
man and woman in America the equivalent 
of two weekly paychecks” each year.2 
It is not clear what taxpayers are getting in 
return.  Studies have revealed that state 
and local incentives are often not cost-
effective mechanisms for economic 
development because subsidized 
companies often relocate or fail to create 
the jobs and other public benefits 
promised. 3  Critics point to empirical 
evidence that incentives cost more than the 
public benefits they create and redirect 
monies from other important public goods 
like infrastructure and education.  And 
there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that 
incentives poison inter-jurisdictional 
relations, contribute to sprawl, favor large 
businesses over small, strain the planning 
capacity of local government, and are 
subject to cronyism and abuse.4  Good 
government advocates and libertarians 
alike regularly call for an end to such 
practices. 
But demands for federal legislation that 
would eliminate the practice of incentives 
have been largely ignored.  Critics admit 
that, despite their general distaste for 
incentives and the competitive inter-
jurisdictional relations they create, such 
programs are difficult to condemn across 
the board.  Incentives, along with zoning 
and land use regulations, are one of the 
few sources of bargaining leverage that 
local governments have over developers 
and businesses.  They use the leverage in 
attempts to strategically influence site-
location decisions and the magnitude of 
private investment.   Whereas some 
jurisdictions are held hostage to demands 
of businesses and sign off on expensive 
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long-term commitments, other states and 
cities are able to negotiate better 
agreements.  These local governments 
absorb relatively little risk and commit 
relatively little up-front investment in 
relation to the public benefits created. 
Our position is that if economic 
development agencies intend to continue 
the practice of offering incentives, they 
should do it in a smarter manner.   
Administrators must focus their energies 
not on rolling out the red carpet for any 
interested party, but on ending up with 
deals that make fiscal sense and protect 
the agency (and the taxpayers) in the event 
of a breach by the incentive recipient.  
Some of this might come by pushing for 
more detailed statutes and ordinances that 
govern the incentive relationship.  But the 
most important opportunity -- and most 
often squandered -- is the negotiation and 
drafting of individual contracts. That 
government agencies often overlook 
opportunities for promoting the public 
good in this process should come as no 
surprise: while such contractual 
mechanisms have been used in Europe for 
decades, they have only recently become 
accepted practice in the United States. 
Without a comprehensive guide to drafting 
contracts that make incentive recipients 
more accountable to taxpayers and 
residents, economic development 
departments must either reinvent the 
wheel every time they wish to grant an 
incentive or rely on standardized 
“boilerplate” contracts that may not offer 
them the protection they need because 
they are old or do not sufficiently account 
for the particularities of the deal. 
Conversations with practitioners reveal 
that, especially in smaller municipalities 
and counties, they waste time calling 
around to other local governments or 
negotiating with their legal departments 
over exact wording.  Even when they are 
seeking to make incentives more 
economically efficient, practitioners lack 
adequate information about the different 
legal mechanisms and techniques that 
would allow them to do so. 
This handbook is designed to provide local 
economic development practitioners with 
an important tool.  It takes the reader step-
by-step through the different elements of 
contracts that treat public incentive 
packages as a quid pro quo for public 
benefits.  Each section discusses a different 
element of the ideal deal: valuation of 
public costs and benefits, performance 
standards, disclosure and oversight, and 
enforcement.  In each section we provide 
detailed examples of model provisions 
used by local governments in their 
incentive legislation, ordinances, and 
contracts -- information that has not before 
been obtained or recorded in any 
systematic way.  These examples are meant 
to both illustrate the key principles for 
negotiating ideal deals and also serve as 
templates for actual contract language. 
They are supplemented with commentary 
culled from interviews conducted with 
local government officials, academic 
studies, and reports by watchdog 
organizations around the country. 
Giving away tax revenues with few strings 
attached is not an effective way of meeting 
policy objectives or managing public 
finances.  Following the best practices 
provided in this handbook is a first step 
toward designing legally enforceable 
contracts that can protect public interests 
and more widely distribute the benefits of 
economic development.  
INTRODUCTION 
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Development incentives and regulatory 
environments matter less to companies 
when deciding between distinct regions of 
the country.  The availability and cost of 
skilled labor, occupancy costs, proximity to 
key customers and suppliers, 
transportation and utility costs, and the 
whims of corporate executives are more 
important at this stage.  Once a company 
has narrowed its choice of location to a 
particular region, however, it begins to 
consider the tax burden and physical 
characteristics of potential sites.  The site 
location decision could be a relatively 
private affair: the business purchases land, 
hires a developer and employees, and pays 
whatever taxes it is determined to owe.  
Aside from obtaining the requisite building 
permits and complying with existing 
zoning and environmental regulations, the 
business could have little contact with the 
public sector. 
Negotiations ensue only if the business 
wants something more from local 
government, or the local government 
wants something more from business.  
What that “more” is is often contested 
because public and private responsibilities 
in economic development are not fixed and 
unchanging.  The principle, for example, 
that a city should not be responsible for 
the development costs of individual 
businesses (because this falls squarely 
within a private realm) is difficult to 
support given the long history of public 
assistance to business.  The recent history 
of intense incentive use has blurred the 
boundaries of public and private roles 
making it impossible to defer to principle 
or precedent.  Every case, therefore, must 
be negotiated on its own merits. 
While contracts will vary, it is clear that 
without legally enforceable one specifying 
the obligations of the respective parties, an 
economic development incentive will be 
considered a gift and not part of a quid pro 
quo exchange.  This distinction is not just 
semantic; it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
tell someone how to use a gift.  Consider 
the following three examples: 
**** 
The Triangle Corporation decided to move 
equipment out of its Diamond Tool plant in 
Duluth, Minnesota after the city issued $10 
million in Industrial Development Revenue 
Bonds to finance the corporation’s 
acquisition and modernization there.  
When the City of Duluth sued, the court 
found that “while the parties discussed a 
restriction which would have required 
Triangle to guarantee certain employment 
levels at the company. . . the party’s final 
agreement did not contain specific 




the incentive to the jobs was therefore 
unenforceable.5 
**** 
When the township of Ypsilanti and the 
County of Washtenaw, Michigan sought to 
recover $13.5 million of a much larger 
package of tax abatements from General 
Motors (GM) Corporation after GM 
announced plans to close its auto assembly 
plant and consolidate production in 
Arlington, Texas.6  The company had 
employed 4,500 workers at its Willow Run 
plant. 
The local governments claimed that GM 
had a made a binding promise to produce 
cars at Willow Run in return for the tax 
abatements. Although the trial court judge 
ruled in their favor, GM got the decision 
overturned on appeal. The appellate court 
held that public statements by GM that 
were previously interpreted as promises 
were actually “expressions of hopes or 
expectations that operations would 
continue at Willow Run.”  The appeals 
court suggested that any company would 
“tak(e) advantage of statutory 
opportunities” to obtain a tax abatement 
and that GM had made no real assurances 
of continued employment. 
**** 
The City of Roanoke, Virginia authorized a 
grant of $500,000 to First Union National 
Bank to train 200 new workers and retain 
359 existing jobs.7  First Union signed a 
contract with the City to keep all of these 
jobs in its downtown branch for at least 
five years.  After one year the bank had 
drawn down $326,000 of the grant, yet 
there were not only no new jobs, the bank 
had actually reduced the number of 
previously existing ones.  It subsequently 
announced that it would close the entire 
downtown loan servicing operation. 
Luckily, the City of Roanoke had signed a 
contract with First Union that specified the 
number of jobs the bank had promised to 
create and maintain and the period of time 
over which this promise was to be binding.  
In addition, the contract contained 
provisions which required that the bank 
pay the city $400 for each job it did not 
create.  When the bank failed to create the 
promised number of jobs, it refunded the 
money it owed and modified the contract 
with the city to create jobs in a different 
neighborhood branch.   
**** 
The experiences of Duluth, Ypsilanti, and 
Roanoke make clear that contracts play an 
important role in holding companies to 
their promises of job creation and local 
investment.  Contracts – also known as 
development, redevelopment, or incentive 
agreements – are the focus of this 
handbook because they are the 
embodiment of all the different aspects of 
economic development deal-making 
process. 
Drafting a contract that specifies promised 
benefits and includes enforcement 
measures is not difficult to do.  In fact, the 
idea is quite simple: if developers and 
companies seek financial assistance from 
the public sector in order to start-up or 
expand their operations, they must be 
prepared to: (a) invest in the community 
through job creation and capital 
investment; (b) treat local governments as 
they would any other contracting party; 
and (c) expect consequences for breaching 
their agreement.  Contract law will govern 
how an agreement is drafted and how 
BACKGROUND
5 
THE IDEAL DEAL 
courts will interpret it. 
Contract law is, however, state law, and 
state legislation plays a critical role in 
drafting and enforcing good contracts. In 
our federal system, states possess more 
regulatory powers than municipalities and 
counties.  As such, courts tend to defer to 
states and their legislatures when 
enforcing incentive contracts.  If the 
legislature expresses a clear intent to 
promote specific goals through their 
economic development programs, even 
judges who are hostile to these goals will 
find themselves constrained to a degree to 
respect that intent.  Having state statutes 
that embody the aforementioned principles 
allows for the imposition of conditions that 
could not be attained in contract 
negotiations but must be accepted as a 
matter of law.  Moreover legislation is 
uniform throughout the state and 
establishes identifiable standards that 
reduce destructive inter-municipal 
competition.  
The strongest contracts, therefore, are 
those whose key provisions are reinforced 
by similar and strong legislation.  In the 
following pages we offer model language 
that can be adopted in individual 
development agreements and contracts 
local governments sign with subsidized 
businesses as well as in state statutes and 
municipal ordinances. 
Moreover, in each state, special rules will 
govern the terms of individual contracts. 
While we choose to focus on some of the 
most important and generally valid 
principles, the handbook is not intended to 




SECTION ONE:  
VALUING PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS 
Before any subsidy changes hands, local 
officials should have a solid understanding 
of the value of the expected public benefits 
and the real public costs of the incentives 
offered.  Unfortunately, whether due to a 
perceived lack of technical precision or 
pressure to approve deals quickly, many 
officials do not thoroughly evaluate the 
costs and benefits of their subsidy 
programs.  For example, a survey of local 
economic development practitioners 
showed only 24 percent possessed 
quantitative techniques for analyzing 
deals.8 
Even when quantitative measures are 
developed, they often fail to capture the 
true costs and benefits due to bad 
accounting practices.  Most local 
governments tally benefits on the revenue 
side of the ledger, including property 
taxes, paybacks and profit sharing. On the 
expense side, however, costs typically 
include only direct cash outlays.  They 
exclude the opportunity costs tied to 
below-market interest rates, deferred 
paybacks, loan guarantees, and in-kind 
expenses. 
They exclude tax expenditures, which are 
the most important and yet most 
misunderstood type of subsidy.  If 
accounting practices do not recognize 
these different kinds of expenditures or fail 
to acknowledge how incentives are often 
backed by promises to be paid by future 
revenues, accounts can not be considered 
to be in balance.9 
Indeed, one of the reasons why incentives 
are so attractive to local governments is 
that they are often made off budget. 
Although more than half of all states now 
require “tax expenditure budgets” (that are 
intended to record the opportunity costs of 
any uncollected tax revenues in addition to 
any appropriated expenditures), their 
quality and exhaustiveness is uneven.  
Local governments that wish to better 
manage their finances in this area are 
urged to follow the advice listed below. 
Estimate how much the public 
benefits are “worth” relative to 
the amount of the subsidy 
Most municipalities and many states do not 
have the expertise to conduct 
comprehensive cost-benefit analyses of 
incentive deals to determine whether the 
local benefits justify the loss of tax 
revenues. Cost-benefit analysis allows the 
analyst to compare the present value of 
anticipated public costs (e.g., cash 
expenses, foregone revenues and 
additional expenditures on services, such 
as schools and infrastructure) to the 
present value of expected benefits (e.g., tax 
7 
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revenues and fees, new jobs, revenues 
generated by salaries of new employees 
and multiplier effects) ex ante. 
This form of analysis can determine if the 
costs of subsidies are likely to outweigh 
the revenues generated over a particular 
time period, thus alerting public officials to 
the fact that a deal may provide too little 
payback for the expected expenses 
incurred.  Cost-benefit spreadsheet 
programs can help the public sector 
determine the “tipping point” (less subsidy, 
more public benefits) at which the deal 
makes financial sense. 
Commercially-available software programs, 
such as IMPLAN and Regional Economic 
Models Incorporated (REMI), or ones 
developed by universities, such as the 
University of Illinois at Chicago, allow 
government officials to evaluate both the 
employment and revenue impacts of 
potential incentive deals.10  Missouri and 
Indianapolis use cost-benefit programs 
developed by private consultants to 
analyze each potential project.  Many cost-
benefit analyses are really only evaluating 
the fiscal impacts on the local government, 
i.e., the public expenditure and revenue 
effects of a subsidy, instead of the benefits 
and costs related to the induced and 
indirect employment ostensibly spurred by 
the corporate relocation or expansion.  In 
Indianapolis, for example, if the fiscal 
impact analysis shows that it will take more 
than four years for a particular project to 
offer a positive revenue return to the city, 
it is not considered a project that is eligible 
for incentives. 
Both fiscal impact analysis and cost-benefit 
analysis provide a ballpark estimate of how 
much each subsidized job or dollar of new 
revenue will cost.  Armed with this 
information, local governments can cap the 
amount of incentives available.  The U.S. 
Small Business Administration and the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban 
Development have subsidy limits of 
$35,000 per created or retained job.11        
A handful of states have followed their 
lead.  Illinois’ Department of Commerce 
and Economic Opportunity caps incentives 
at $10,000 per job created or retained 
through its Community Development 
Assistance Program.  Minnesota, 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey and West Virginia 
also cap subsidies at $15,000 to $35,000 
per job created. 
While analytical tools are helpful, it is 
important to understand the assumptions 
underlying the models in order to feel 
confident of their predictive power.  There 
are two areas where the spreadsheet 
models could stand to be improved.  First, 
prospective public benefits like physical 
improvements and environmental cleanup 
may be difficult to value because, in most 
instances and without the use of 
sophisticated modeling, they have no 
obvious market price.  Second, many local 
costs of subsidies are often shifted to the 
state or federal governments, and these 
intergovernmental transfers are not 
captured by cost-benefit analysis 
conducted only at the local scale.  For 
example, the use of tax increment 
financing (TIF) by local governments may 
trigger additional transfers of aid from the 
state to equalize school funding.  A more 
comprehensive analysis would be inclusive 
of costs borne by all levels of government. 
Require corporate disclosure of 
relevant information 
Ideally, local governments would know 
how much bargaining leverage they have 
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with companies who request their 
assistance.  What are other municipalities 
or states offering the company, and how 
important are these incentives to its 
investment decisions?  Unfortunately, 
much of this “market” data is rarely 
disclosed.  Even worse, many analysts 
suggest that, goaded by site selection 
consultants, companies frequently 
overstate the role of incentives in 
determining where companies choose to 
expand or relocate, and that many even 
decide on their project sites before 
governments make subsidy offers.12  In 
other words, the financial gap companies 
seek to fill to make a project feasible may 
be much smaller than they would have the 
public sector believe.  They can bluff and 
demand more than is really necessary 
because management has access to 
relevant information about the firm’s own 
cost structure and hurdle rates to which 
local governments are not privy.  In 
practice, the government that is most 
optimistic about the value of economic 
development or has the most lax budget 
and statutory constraints will be the 
highest bidder. 
Despite these hurdles, local governments 
can make some efforts to ensure that the 
incentive is necessary or, at a minimum, 
somewhat important to the company’s 
location decision.  Disclosure requirements 
can allow the public sector to gain more 
knowledge about a business’ actual costs 
and financing needs and may force possible 
subsidy recipients to demonstrate their 
interest in a particular location.  The city of 
Minneapolis’ 1998 living wage ordinance, 
for example, requires applicants for public 
contracts or financial assistance to provide 
the names of all programs to which they 
are applying and the total public cost of 
the assistance. 
In Illinois, existing businesses seeking 
assistance must provide the state with the 
prospective plan for which 1,500 full-time 
jobs would be eliminated in the event that 
the business is not designated as a “High 
Impact Business” (a designation that allows 
it to access certain state tax exemptions).  
Proposals for new facilities must provide 
proof of an alternative non-Illinois site that 
would receive the proposed investment 
and job creation in the event that the 
business is not designated as a High Impact 
Business.  This increased transparency may 
overcome some of the problems associated 
with bluffing, and, if staff can check on 
counter offers, may deter companies from 
playing multiple jurisdictions off each other 
in order to ratchet up the price of the 
subsidy. 
Other incentive programs require that 
applicants disclose their development and 
operating pro forma and identify gaps that 
they are seeking to have filled by public 
assistance.  Government personnel need to 
be financially literate enough to make 
sense of these spreadsheets, be familiar 
with current cost estimates, and identify 
costs that are being overstated. 
While disclosure requirements may place a 
burden on the corporate subsidy-seeker to 
demonstrate that they are serious about 
relocating, these provisions are generally 
less effective (i.e., legally binding) than 
those we will discuss in the following 
chapters.  For example, it is easy to falsify 
or exaggerate a firm’s cost structure for 
strategic effect.  Development consultants 
regularly admit that firms draft separate 
pro forma for separate purposes (e.g., 
understating revenues for incentive and 
income tax purposes while overstating 
them for lenders). 
VALUING PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS 
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Local governments should be aware that 
disclosure requirements are among the 
weaker forms of subsidy accountability and 
although they may be included in 
contracts, they offer few substantive 
protections.  If they are going to be 
required, they must be used in tandem 
with impact analysis, performance 
standards, and enforceability mechanisms. 
Avoid reliance on “but for” 
provisions  
Incentive programs often require the 
company to attest to the fact that it would 
not have considered the municipality as a 
potential location or would have 
eliminated a certain number of jobs but for 
the incentive.  For example, the Michigan 
Economic Growth Act (MEGA) provides 
that: 
The tax credits authorized under the 
agreement address the competitive 
disadvantages of locating in Michigan 
instead of a site outside of the state; the 
project will not occur in Michigan 
without the tax credits offered by this 
agreement.  If the company 
misrepresents itself by making this 
statement, the authority may revoke the 
company’s eligibility for further credits.13  
Sometimes these “but for” clauses even 
come with teeth.  In Illinois, for example, if 
a business receives the designation of 
“High Impact Business” in order to access 
certain state tax exemptions and it is later 
determined that the business would have 
made the investment and created or 
retained the requisite number of jobs 
without the benefits of the designation, the 
state department of economic 
development will revoke that 
designation.14  It is also supposed to notify 
the state department of revenue to begin 
proceedings to recover all wrongfully 
exempted state taxes with interest (i.e., 
clawbacks, a contractual provision we 
discuss in more detail in Section Four). 
All of these types of “but for” provisions 
are intended to protect against the 
possibility that the firm does not really 
need the subsidy but is taking advantage of 
its superior bargaining position (the fact 
that firms are mobile but governments are 
not) to seek whatever assistance is 
available.  The problem with these 
provisions is that they create a false sense 
of security.  “But for” clauses are 
notoriously easy to elude and difficult to 
disprove – so difficult, in fact, that few 
states or cities actually enforce them.  
How, after all, can one demonstrate 
definitively that the incentive does or does 
not matter in a firm’s location decision?  
What constitutes proof that an expansion 
decision was made only because of the 
incentive?  Research has consistently 
demonstrated that subsidies are rarely the 
deal-makers or deal-breakers; other factors 
tend to be much more important in the 
location decision-making calculus of a 
firm.15 
“But for” provisions are very common in 
state statutes and redevelopment 
agreements despite the fact that they do 
not really guard against bluffing. It is 
critical to remember that they are no 
substitute for strong performance 
standards, oversight provisions, and 
enforcement mechanisms, topics to which 
we now turn. 
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What is an “ideal deal” from the 
perspective of the local government?  That 
depends on what the local government 
hopes to achieve from its economic 
development programs.  While the answer 
to this question may seem obvious (“good 
jobs,” “economic diversification,” “a 
stronger tax base”), knowing exactly why a 
particular community wants economic 
development can be difficult to intuit.  Is it 
more important, for example, to bring in 
new jobs for an underemployed but skilled 
labor force or to redevelop a deteriorating 
section of the main street that has become 
an eyesore?  Input from key stakeholders 
and community residents often provides a 
sense of which goals are a priority.  Once 
these goals have been defined, they can 
then be translated into specific, legally 
binding performance standards. 
Identify the authorizing statute 
The goals of economic development 
programs and the authority to give 
incentives are often contained in state 
statutes, which can be used to guide 
municipalities through the incentive 
process.  And while the guidance might be 
very general, it is nonetheless important to 
refer to the statute in local agreements and 
mimic its language.  For example: 
 
The MEGA Program was created by the 
Michigan Economic Growth Authority 
Act, Act No.24 of Public Acts of 1995.  It 
gives Michigan municipalities the power 
to provide tax credits to businesses 
involved in manufacturing, mining, 
research, development, wholesale, trade 
and/or office operations, and enterprise 
for the purpose of . . .16 
Referencing the authorizing statute 
ensures that there is no ambiguity about 
the purpose of the contract and the 
authority to make it.  It will also put the 
incentive recipient on notice of any 
statutory obligations that may not be 
contained in the contract itself. 
It is important to remember that the 
authorizing statute typically sets a floor, 
not a ceiling, for the amount of control and 
the number of conditions a grantor may 
put on an incentive.  This means city, 
regional, and state agencies have a certain 
amount of discretion to require behavior 
from assisted developers and companies 
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Articulate performance 
standards as specifically as 
possible 
The public goals of the incentive must be 
stated explicitly so that it is possible to 
evaluate the extent to which the firms 
granted the inducements are complying 
with the conditions imposed.  It is 
generally a mistake to be vague; 
“stimulating the economy,”  “creating 
jobs,” and “increasing the tax base” are 
suitable as intent language in authorizing 
statutes.  But they are not appropriate for 
development contracts because they are so 
open-ended that they impose no effective 
constraints on the granting authority nor 
do they give the courts much meaningful 
guidance in interpreting contractual 
conditions. 
The terms of a contract must be clear in 
order to be enforceable.  Ordinary words 
should be used in their ordinary contexts. 
Technical terms should be defined. If there 
is more than one reasonable definition, 
state which one is intended in the 
document itself.  Contracts that rely on 
very loose parameters of fulfillment are 
considered “incomplete” and provide 
parties with opportunities to exploit 
existing gaps. 
Some states have taken steps to limit such 
gaps.  For example, Minnesota requires 
state agencies and municipalities to 
develop explicit benchmarks for awarding 
subsidies.  These public purpose 
benchmarks include standards for job 
creation and for the wages of the new jobs.  
Moreover, job retention is only considered 
a legitimate criterion “where job loss is 
imminent and demonstrable.”17  The law 
includes an exemption for business loans 
and loan guarantees of $75,000 or less to 
ensure that job creation and wage 
requirements do not harm start-up 
businesses, particularly those in low-
income communities.  The law requires 
each incentive-granting agency to submit 
their benchmarks to the Department of  
Employment and Economic Development 
and for the department to publish them 
annually. 
If a term is ambiguous, its meaning may 
have to be interpreted by a judge.  And 
courts cannot be counted on to find legally 
binding obligations that may seem obvious 
to the contracting parties at the time the 
contract is made but are not written in the 
contract itself.  They often defer to the 
Parole Evidence Rule, which excludes any 
evidence of prior or contemporaneous 
agreements from consideration in a 
dispute over the interpretation of a 
contract. 
This is especially true for mortgage 
agreements and other loan documents.  
Courts interpret loan contracts according 
to the principles and purposes of loan 
security.  If the municipality signs a 
mortgage agreement with a firm for a low-
interest loan, it must also specify the wider 
purpose of the incentive or else the court’s 
primary concern will be the company’s 
adherence to conventional loan terms (e.g., 
making payments on time, collateral 
security).  For example, the state of West 
Virginia loaned over $64 million to Anchor 
Hocking to help the company keep its plant 
open and provide jobs to its employees. 
Unfortunately it failed to state these 
purposes in the actual loan documents.  
The absence of a specific goal, coupled 
with a contractual provision allowing 
prepayment of the loan without penalty, 
led the court to conclude that the firm 
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satisfied its obligations by paying off the 
loan.18 
Given these perils, the written contract 
should represent the complete 
understanding between the parties. In the 
following sections, we provide examples of 
the language used in contracts across the 
country to describe the different kinds of 
public benefits that local governments may 
pursue through their use of incentives. 
JOB CREATION AND RETENTION 
Performance standards typically make 
incentives conditional on employment 
projections.  An early study of nine grant 
and loan programs found that all required 
recipient firms to specify projected job 
creation.19 
Local governments use two kinds of 
payment provisions for securing these 
benefits.  The first sets a threshold job 
creation requirement as a condition for 
receiving public assistance.  The second 
offers a specific amount of incentive on a 
per-job basis.  An example of a threshold 
requirement is the Iowa New Jobs and 
Income Agreement, which provides that: 
The (subsidized) business must create at 
least 50 new full-time jobs at the project 
location within five years of the 
application approval and must maintain 
that level for five years after first meeting 
that obligation.20 
A business taking advantage of Michigan’s 
Economic Growth Act (MEGA) program: 
(M)ust create 75 new jobs if it is 
expanding its facility within Michigan, 
150 jobs if it is relocating to the state; 
and 25 jobs if the facility is relocating to 
a state enterprise zone.21  
The second kind of provision does not 
provide any funds to the company until the 
job has been created.  “Back-loading” 
incentives based on the number of jobs is 
an attractive option for local governments.  
This kind of payment clause can potentially 
protect the jurisdiction’s investment in 
case the company is not successful or falls 
behind in its hiring schedule. 
The $2.5 million incentive package 
negotiated between Bismarck, North 
Dakota and Coventry Healthcare contained 
a provision that gave Coventry 
incrementally larger payments as hiring 
progressed.22  The city was thus allowed to 
withhold its largest payment until the final 
group of employees had been hired. 
Another example of contract language that 
requires incentives to be calibrated to 
successive employment levels is from 
Vermont’s Small Business Investment Tax 
Credit: 
A person may receive a credit against its 
income taxes in an amount equal to five 
to ten percent of its investments within 
the state of Vermont in excess of 
$150,000 in plants or facilities and 
machinery and equipment in the 
applicable tax year according to the 
following:  
1) A person employing fewer than 150 
full-time employees may receive an 
income tax credit equal to ten percent 
of its investments in plants or 
facilities and machinery and 
equipment in the applicable tax year. 
2) A person employing between 150 and 
250 full-time employees may receive 
an income tax credit of six to nine 
percent of its investments in plants or 
SETTING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 
13 
THE IDEAL DEAL 
facilities and machinery and 
equipment in the applicable tax year 
based on the following proportional 
sliding scale: 
(a) a nine percent tax credit for 150-
174 full-time employees; 
(b) an eight percent tax credit for 
175-199 full-time employees; 
(c) a seven percent tax credit for 
200-224 full-time employees; and  
(d) a six percent tax credit for 225-
250 full-time employees. 
3) A person employing more than 250 
full-time employees may receive an 
income tax credit equal to five percent 
of its investment in plants or 
facilities.23 
These types of payment clauses are 
common with corporate income tax 
credits.  Standing alone, their inclusion in a 
contract is not an entirely foolproof means 
of ensuring accountability.  Many of the 
“new” positions may have been created in 
the absence of public assistance; the fact 
that they are created before the public 
assistance changes hands begs the 
question of whether the incentives were 
truly necessary from an operating 
standpoint.  Moreover, local officials may 
neglect to place effective monitoring and 
enforcement standards (e.g., clawbacks 
discussed later) in such contracts because 
they feel unduly protected by the presence 
of back-end payment schemes. 
Regardless of which approach the local 
government takes, the contract should 
define the kinds of jobs that count toward 
job creation and retention goals.  Simply 
requiring a certain number of “jobs” would 
leave a court the option of interpreting its 
meaning as either full-time and part-time 
positions.  Generally “full-time” implies 
that employees work a minimum of 35 
hours per week (this is the case, for 
example, in order to qualify for protection 
under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) of 1974).  Contracts in 
Iowa include a definition of a “Full-Time 
Equivalent Job” as the equivalent of 
employment of one person for eight hours 
per day for a five day, forty-hour workweek 
for fifty weeks per year.24  The employment 
tax credit available to financial institutions 
in Delaware is only applicable for full-time 
employees who are eligible for health 
insurance benefits.25   It is always best, 
however, not to rely on external sources 
for definitions.  The best contracts will 
state the precise number of hours and 
perhaps necessary benefit levels for a 
position to count as a “job” under the 
terms of the contract. 
Contracts can also prohibit the substitution 
of existing employees to meet job 
requirements.  The Ohio Tax Credit statute 
excludes from the calculation of “new jobs” 
any employee who is hired to replace an 
employee who was already employed at 
the project location at the time the project 
was approved.  It also excludes employees 
or employment positions that were 
transferred to the project location from 
another company operation located in 
Ohio.26 
In 2002, the Kansas Court of Appeals ruled 
that “(a) taxpayer business which hires five new 
employees but dismisses ten existing employees 
has not added five employees.”27  The court’s 
decision upheld the denial of a tax 
exemption by the Kansas Department of 
Revenue to a business that failed to 
increase its workforce with enough new 
employees to qualify for the exemption.  
This case illustrates the need for contracts 
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that require the hiring of a certain number 
of employees to also specify their minimum 
period of employment.  Otherwise, an 
employer could attempt to hire employees 
and then terminate them after qualifying 
for the subsidy.  This is also why, as we will 
discuss, it is critical to adopt a monitoring 
system that will allow local governments to 
oversee the manner in which the assisted 
company is adhering to the agreement. 
WAGES AND BENEFITS 
The number of jobs may be less important 
than the quality of the jobs created and 
whether or not local residents can fill 
them.   As such, local governments are 
slowly realizing that they must specify 
other performance standards that go 
beyond job creation and retention targets.  
A 2003 survey found that at least 43 states, 
41 cities, and 5 counties – a total of 89 
jurisdictions – now attach job quality 
standards to at least one development 
subsidy, up from just two in 1989.28 
Many states now require contracts to 
specify a particular wage rate.  Good Jobs 
First reports that wage standards are 
generally based on one of three types of 
formulas: poverty measures such as the 
federal poverty rate or state and federal 
minimum wages; static dollar amounts; or 
market rates such as the average wage of a 
state, region, county, and/or industry.   
Market-based wage standards are the most 
common type found in state incentive 
programs.  The Maine Employment Tax 
Increment Financing (TIF) and Investment 
Tax Credit programs require that wages 
must exceed the average per capita income 
in the county (or “local area”) where the 
company is located.29  The state’s 
Governor’s Training Initiative requires that 
employees be paid a wage equal to at least 
85 percent of the average wage for that 
occupation in the given labor market, and 
that companies pay at least 50 percent of 
health insurance premiums.  
Cities and counties are more likely to use 
poverty measures to set wage 
requirements.  For example, Minneapolis, 
which imposes wage standards derived 
from either regional industry or 
occupational averages, also has a living 
wage law pegged to the poverty rate. 
In most cases, market-based wage 
requirements are higher than those based 
on poverty standards.  For market-based 
requirements, it is preferable to use a 
median wage measure rather than an 
average wage because averages can be 
skewed by a few employees earning very 
high or low wages.  Specifying that the 
wage is for hourly non-management jobs 
also helps ensure that the wage level is not 
skewed by a few higher paying jobs. For 
example, the Iowa New Jobs and Income 
Agreement states that “the business must pay 
a specified median wage for all new full-time 
hourly non-management jobs.” 
Temporary construction wages may also be 
subject to prevailing wage requirements if 
they are subsidized by public monies. The 
states of Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, 
and California require that specific grant-
subsidized private construction projects 
comply with the state’s prevailing 
construction wage rates. For example, the 
Pennsylvania statute provides: 
If the projects for which Grant funds are 
to be used involves the construction, 
reconstruction, demolition, alteration 
and/or repair work other than 
maintenance work, done under contract, 
where the estimate cost of the total 
SETTING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 
15 
THE IDEAL DEAL 
Project is in excess of $25,000, then the 
Grantee shall comply with the provisions 
of the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage 
Act.30  
Contracts may also require that businesses 
provide other benefits to the new or 
retained employees.  Indeed such 
provisions are becoming increasingly 
common, particularly at the local level.  In 
2003, 67 percent of the states with 
standards (43) and 80 percent out of cities 
and counties with standards (46) offered at 
least one incentive program that requires 
healthcare benefits be paid at the 
subsidized firm or encourages them by 
allowing benefits to count towards wage 
requirements.  For example, the Maine 
Quality Centers program requires that 
firms create at least eight new full-time 
jobs and pay 50 percent of the costs of 
health care benefits.  An Iowa statute 
requires the incentive recipient to pay 80 
percent of the cost of a standard medical 
and dental insurance plan for all full-time 
employees working at the project.  This 
statute also encourages the provision of 
child-care services for employees.31 
Many cities allow employers to choose 
between providing benefits and paying 
higher wages.  In 2003, 25 cities and two 
counties required companies to pay higher 
wages if such companies did not provide 
health benefits.  The average amount 
allotted for benefits was $1.50 per hour, 
ranging from $.83 per hour in Duluth to 
$2.34 per hour in San Diego. Oakland, 
Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Richmond, 
California and Burlington, Vermont all 
require employees to receive a certain 
number of days off for sick, vacation, or 
personal leave. 
 
Unfortunately states and cities often lack 
the resources to effectively monitor 
benefits that are provided as part of 
subsidy deals.  Programs may require 
companies to offer coverage to employees, 
but do not require that employees be 
enrolled. 
IN-STATE PREFERENCES  
The question of whether incentive 
programs can require assisted firms to 
favor in-state suppliers and employees over 
out-of-state ones (i.e., “buy or hire local”) is 
legally complex.  The Commerce Clause of 
the Constitution (Article I, § 8, cl. 3) gives 
Congress the power to regulate commerce 
to, among other things, prevent interstate 
competition at the expense of the national 
welfare.  It has historically been 
interpreted to prevent states and 
municipalities from intentionally 
discriminating against out-of-state 
companies. 
However, when the local government acts 
as a “market participant,” rather than as a 
“regulator of commerce”, an exception may 
be made.  The Supreme Court has held that 
the use of grants and in-kind expenditures, 
as opposed to incentives offered as 
abatements or credits through the tax 
system, may trigger the market participant 
exemption in some cases.  The rationale 
for the distinction is that taxation is a basic 
governmental activity representing a 
characteristic exercise of sovereign power, 
which can be distinguished from a local 
government’s voluntary participation in 
market transactions.  When they are not in 
the business of taxation, local governments 
can operate more freely in the national 




For example, hiring requirements can 
sometimes mandate that the subsidized 
business hire workers that are residents of 
a particular geographic area (a city, state) 
or workers that have been “targeted” for 
some other socially relevant reason, e.g., 
individuals transitioning off of public 
assistance or out of prisons.  The Ohio Tax 
Credit Agreement requires that businesses 
either display a “good faith effort” or make 
substantial progress toward hiring those 
most in need of employment.  The Ohio 
statute requires that: 
“Within three years of the project’s initial 
operations, the company must show that a 
certain percentage (specified by the agency) 
of the new employees are either 
disadvantaged persons or minorities (as 
defined in the statute).  The company must 
maintain this percentage throughout the 
term of the agreement.” 
Because it is often unclear whether a 
preference would fall within the market 
participant exception, that question is best 
left to a lawyer.  In cases where it is clear 
that the exception does not apply – and in 
some uncertain cases – legislators and 
contract drafters often require a recipient’s 
best efforts to meet specified goals. While, 
in the eyes of the grantor, these terms may 
be less optimal than out-right 
requirements, they are still helpful towards 
achieving the desired results.  For example, 
in Idaho, recipients of Community 
Development Block Grants must: 
to the greatest extent possible, provide 
opportunities for training and 
employment to lower-income persons 
residing within the unit of local 
government or the metropolitan area of 
non-metropolitan county in which a 
project is located.  They must award 
contracts for work in connection with 
such projects, to the greatest extent 
feasible, to eligible business concerns 
located in or owned in substantial part by 
persons residing in the same metropolitan 
area or non-metropolitan county as the 
project.33 
Similarly, Michigan’s MEGA Tax Credit 
Agreement requires a good faith effort on 
the part of the company: 
to employ, if qualified, Michigan residents 
at the facility.  The company will also 
make a good faith effort to employ or 
contract with Michigan residents and 
firms to construct, rehabilitate, develop, 
or renovate the facility.34 
Subsidy recipients in Minneapolis, Los 
Angeles, and New Britain, Connecticut 
must meet guidelines for local hiring.  
Cities such as Chicago have required 
subsidized firms to make good faith efforts 
to hire workers from within city limits.   
Unfortunately because these are non-
mandatory hiring guidelines, they 
guarantee no results.  In the end, incentive 
recipients retain the autonomy to hire 
whomever they please and can easily make 
the case that none of the targeted 
applicants were employable.  And this may 
well be the case; employers generally have 
a better sense of who would be a good 
employee, and there are sometimes 
mismatches between employment 
opportunities and the skill levels of local 
applicants. 
Given these issues, it is often preferable to 
include specific job marketing, solicitation, 
and training provisions in the incentive 
contract.  These “first source” provisions 
generally avoid any Commerce Clause 
SETTING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 
17 
THE IDEAL DEAL 
concerns.  They can range from a 
requirement that a subsidized firm 
advertise jobs through particular channels 
that have the greatest potential to reach 
targeted candidates, to a requirement to 
interview candidates referred from a 
specific source.  For example, in 
Minneapolis, San Francisco, and Portland, 
Oregon subsidized firms are encouraged to 
sign job linkage agreements, committing 
them to hire new employees through a 
network of placement and training 
community agencies and to post job 
vacancies to the network's database.35  
Individual contracts can expressly require 
such linkages and periodic hiring reports, 
and state repercussions for failing to 
achieve express local hiring goals.  
Contracts can also require the firm to 
retain a specific level of new hires over the 
life span of the incentive. 
And to the extent a contract calls for 
cooperation with an employment or 
training agency, the choice of agencies can 
be left to the grant recipient.  The choice 
can, however, be limited to agencies pre-
qualified by a state or local government  
that  are capable of dealing with the 
employment needs of particular types of 
business.  This allows the recipient some 
choice to use its expertise to avoid 
turnover and attrition while still achieving 
laudable social goals. 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND LABOR PROTECTION 
Some subsidy contracts require the 
assisted firm to meet labor and 
environmental standards, which can be 
higher than those required by existing law 
or regulation. Others require the 
subsidized company to present a clean bill 
of health in so far as unlawful 
environmental or labor practices are 
concerned.  An Iowa statute attempts to 
protect local workers from employers with 
poor records with organized labor.  It 
provides that: 
The employer must represent that it is not 
currently involved in a strike, lockout, or 
other labor dispute at any of its business 
sites in Iowa and that employees receiving 
training are not replacement workers 
who were hired as a result of a strike 
lockout or other labor dispute.36 
Similarly, the William S. Lee Quality Jobs 
and Business Expansion Act passed by the 
North Carolina Legislature provides that: 
A taxpayer is eligible for a credit allowed 
under this Article only if the taxpayer 
certifies that, at the time the taxpayer 
applies for the credit, the taxpayer has no 
pending administrative, civil, or criminal 
enforcement action based on alleged 
significant violations of any program 
implemented by an agency of the 
Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources, and has had no final 
determination of responsibility for any 
significant administrative, civil, or 
criminal violation of any program 
implemented by an agency of the 
Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources within the last five years.37  
This requirement applies to job, worker 
training, investment, and research and 
development tax credits. 
Environmental provisions are often 
included to protect the value of the 
property and to protect the lender from 
liability.  Pennsylvania loan agreements, for 
example, contain provisions requiring 
environmental compliance to protect the 
lender’s interest in the property.            
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The standard loan agreement in Ohio also 
requires annual environmental inspections, 
but like the Pennsylvania template, is 
primarily meant to guard against sudden 
depreciation of the asset. 
 
CAPITAL INVESTMENT AND PROHIBITIONS TO 
RELOCATE 
In order for all of the above-mentioned 
benefits to materialize, the assisted firm 
must continue to invest in its facility and 
operate in place over a particular period of 
time.  There are various measures to use to 
THE CITY OF CHICAGO’S DEAL WITH FORD  
The City of Chicago and the State of 
Illinois crafted an incentive package for 
the Ford Motor Company in 2000 that 
has some of the qualities of an ideal 
deal.  Although the Ford plant has 
operated in Chicago since 1933, the 
company needed to make a critical 
decision in the late 1990s due to a 
change in product line: to retrofit its 
Chicago plant or to relocate.  The city of 
Hapeville, Georgia (where Ford operated 
its Taurus/Sable assembly plant) made 
the decision more complicated by 
offering Ford an attractive incentive 
package.  
Despite the offer from Hapeville, Ford 
chose not to leave Chicago.  The City of 
Chicago and the State of Illinois 
negotiated a $115 million incentive 
package with Ford, which includes both 
direct and tax expenditures but does not 
cover the cost of the new plant itself – a 
measure that ensures Ford has a 
financial stake in the deal.  Ford agreed 
to develop and own an industrial park 
whose space is leased to its suppliers, 
and the City agreed to develop more 
than 900 acres land in the Lake Calumet 
area on the city’s far South Side into an 
inter-modal freight transfer center.   
Both of these developments converted 
brownfield properties into new 
productive uses.  The new supplier park 
was expected to attract approximately 
1,000 new jobs and save 2,500 
unionized jobs at the Ford assembly 
plant.  The Ford plant and supplier-park 
facility are expected to provide $1.3 
billion in tax revenue to the city and 
state over 10 years.  
The deal has several caveats. Ford must 
create a minimum of 1 million square 
feet of building space. The company 
must also guarantee that it will maintain 
the existing union jobs at the main 
plant.  Clawback provisions require Ford 
to create a minimum of 500 full-time 
jobs by the end of 2006 and to maintain 
these jobs through 2011.  If these 
provisions are not met, Ford must pay 
back a percentage of the financing 
proportionate to the percentage of 
promised jobs the company failed to 
create, and it must repay the city for 
infrastructure and road improvements.  
Sources: J. McCourt and G. LeRoy, 2003. “A Better 
Deal for Illinois” Chicago: Good Jobs Illinois; City of 
Chicago Department of Planning and Development 
Annual TIF Report (2001); J. Fitzgerald, 2002, 
“Retention Deficit Disorder” Boston: Center for an 
Urban Future.               
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control this, many of which may be best 
used in tandem.  They include stating the 
amount of time the company must remain 
in place, employment levels, expected long 
term capital investment, and levels of 
additional square feet of occupancy.  Long-
term capital investment is subject to less 
cyclical variation than employment and 
more exacting than square footage 
requirements, and therefore may be a 
better benchmark for performance.         
But whatever combination of these 
measures one chooses to employ, it should 
include an explicit “stay-in-place” 
requirement. 
A capital expenditure provision template 
from a municipality in Marion County, 
Indiana provides that: 
The City commits to providing a six-year 
real property tax abatement. . . as a result 
of the Applicants’ capital expenditure of not 
less than $4,950,000 or of not less than 
$2,831,400 on leased space associated 
with the redevelopment and/or 
rehabilitation activities.38   
What is critical here is the express tying of 
the abatement to a fixed level of 
investment. 
Although optimal, it is highly unlikely that 
a business would promise to stay in one 
place in perpetuity – just to fulfill its 
obligations for a tax abatement.  Still, local 
officials should expect a firm to remain in 
the locality for a reasonable amount of 
time, which is often tied to the length of 
the subsidy or abatement.  For example, a 
Connecticut program prohibits the 
recipient “from relocating during the term the 
loan is outstanding or for ten years after 
receiving assistance, whichever is longer.”39 
Minnesota law requires that the assisted 
company obtain the local government’s 
permission to move outside of the 
community if it moves within five years of 
receiving the subsidy.  This permission can 
only be granted after a public hearing is 
held.  In Ohio, assisted companies must 
maintain their operations at the project 
location for twice the number of years as 
the term of the tax credit.40  Iowa has 
particularly stringent standards: 
So long as the Business is indebted to Iowa 
Department of Economic Development 
(IDED) or Community, the Business shall 
not, without prior written disclosure to the 
Community and IDED and prior written 
consent of IDED, directly of indirectly: 
a) assign, waive, or transfer any of 
business’ rights, powers, duties, or 
obligations under this loan agreement;   
b) sell, transfer, convey, assign, encumber, 
or otherwise dispose of any of the real 
property or other collateral securing the 
loan; 
c) place or permit any restrictions, 
covenants or any similar limitations on 
the real property and/or other collateral 
securing the loan; 
d) remove from the project site of the state 
all or any part of the collateral securing 
the loan; 
e) relocate its operations, physical 
facilities of jobs (including Created, 
Retained, and Community Base Jobs) 
assisted with the loan proceeds outside 
the community or abandon its 
operations of facilities or a substantial 
portion thereof with the community 
during the loan term.41  
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States often treat in-state and out-of-state 
relocation differently.  The State of Ohio 
reduces the penalties if the relocation is 
made within the state.  Connecticut sets no 
penalty for in-state relocation, but requires 
that “if the business relocates within state, it 
must offer employment to its employees from 
the original location if employment is available, 
or the authority may terminate guarantee of 
the loan.”42  The Michigan MEGA program 
allows in-state relocation only if the 
municipality condones the move.  Some 
states, such as Pennsylvania and Iowa, 
prohibit in-state relocation altogether 
unless it is the result of an expansion that 
does not close or substantially reduce 
operations at the originally subsidized 
facility.  Moreover, in Iowa a company is 
eligible for a grant only if it has not closed 
or reduced operations in one area of the 
state to relocate in another.43 
Set a benefits period 
How much time should an assisted 
company be given to make good on its 
promises?  “Benefit periods” are often set 
arbitrarily in contracts even though 
companies have a good sense of how long 
it will take them to complete specific 
projects.  The company should provide 
some guidance about the expected project 
period, after which time the benefits (e.g., 
new employees hired, amount of capital 
invested) should have materialized.  
Without a benefit period, the company will 
have an indefinite amount of time in which 
to fulfill its promises. 
When local governments use loan 
programs, they expect that the assisted 
company will not relocate until the loan 
and interest have been repaid.  Some 
programs require the company to state 
that, at the time the contract is signed, it 
intends to operate for the term of the loan 
or project period. This is problematic 
because the company will not be 
considered to be in violation of the 
contract if it ceases operations before the 
loan is repaid -- if it intended to operate 
the plant for the agreed-upon time period.  
It also means that the company can pay off 
the loan early and leave without penalty.44  
Therefore, if a municipality expects a 
facility to remain in the locality for some 
time beyond the loan term, it should 
specify those expectations in the contract 
and not treat the loan period as the benefit 
period. 
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SECTION THREE:  
DETERMINING BREACH OF CONTRACT 
THROUGH MONTINORING AND DISCLOSURE  
If a company does not comply with the 
terms and conditions of the contact, it may 
be considered to have “breached” it.  
Although ceasing operations or relocating 
out of state may look like clear violation of 
an incentive agreement, determining when 
an assisted firm has breached its contract is 
not as simple as it may appear.  Because a 
finding of breach can lead to the 
imposition of costly penalties and damages 
(discussed in the next section), it is 
important to clearly define what 
constitutes a breach is in the agreement 
itself. 
Define breach of contract 
A breach may be total or partial.  Generally, 
a total breach is failure by one party to 
perform a significant obligation or 
obligations under the agreement.  A total 
breach entitles the injured party to 
suspend performance of its side of the 
bargain and consider the contractual 
relationship dissolved.  If the non-
breaching party continues to carry out its 
contractual obligations despite the other 
party’s total breach, it may waive its right 
to seek redress for the total breach. 
A partial breach is a failure by one party to 
perform a somewhat less significant 
obligation under the agreement.  For 
example, an assisted company may create 
the agreed-upon number of jobs but not 
provide employees filling the positions 
with some other promised benefit.  Most 
often a partial breach does not terminate a 
contract; each party must continue to 
perform its duties and seek redress 
through negotiation, the courts, or through 
the provisions of the agreement that 
provide for such contingencies.  
Determining what constitutes a “total” and 
“partial” breach is often a nuanced legal 
question that requires consultation with an 
attorney.  What is important here is that 
parties may anticipate breaches and 
provide solutions for them in the 
agreement, which can eliminate the need 
to resort to the courts should a breach 
occur. 
If a party does not want a particular breach 
to terminate the entire contract, then a 
statement outlining the specific 
consequences for the specific violations 
must be included in the contract.  For 
example the Indianapolis Economic 
Development Corporation Memorandum of 
Agreement (2002) provides: 
The City, by and through the Metropolitan 
Development Commission, reserves the right 
to terminate property tax abatement 
deductions for the project if it determines 
that the applicant has not made reasonable 
efforts to substantially comply with all of the 
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commitments and the applicant’s failure to 
substantially comply with the commitments 
was not due to factors beyond its control. 
In a specific case, breach was further 
defined: 
As used in this agreement, “substantial 
compliance” shall mean the applicant’s 
compliance with the following: 
(i) making capital expenditures of not less 
than $2,689,830  on the leased space; 
and  
(ii) the creation of not less than 95 new 
permanent full-time positions with 
average hourly wage rates of $12.65; and  
(iii) the retention of 119 full-time positions 
with average hourly wage rates of 
$13.54. 
If the company fails to comply with more 
than one of the substantial compliance 
categories, then repayment may be based 
on the highest level of non-compliance. 
Defining breach in this manner provides 
the parties and, if necessary, ultimately a 
court with some meaningful guidance in 
enforcing the specific provisions of the 
contract. 
When incentives resemble “normal” 
commercial instruments, such as 
mortgages, leases, or loans, defining 
breach is even more important.  This is 
because the intentions of the government 
agency (“creating jobs”) may be different 
from the standard obligations of the 
financial instruments, such as making 
regular loan payments. 
In contract law, an immediate remedy is 
available for almost any breach, although in 
all but the most extreme cases, the party 
found to be in breach must be given a 
reasonable time to “cure” the default.  
Minnesota companies receive a two-year 
grace period to fulfill their contractual 
obligations. The two-year period may be 
extended by one year, but only if the 
government agency holds a public hearing 
to review the circumstances.  In 
Indianapolis, companies that have not met 
the outlined performance standards are put 
on probation for one year. If during the 
probation period the standards are still not 
met, the Indianapolis Economic 
Development Corporation has the right to 
cancel the incentive and require the 
company to repay the percentage of the 
incentive already received in proportion to 
the percent of their obligation they failed 
to achieve. 
Define exceptions 
There are exigent business circumstances 
that may rightly excuse firms for failing to 
meet their contractual promises.  Such 
exigencies can be accounted for in the 
contract.  For example, in some 
agreements Ohio excuses a breach for 
failure to create or retain the number of 
jobs fixed in the agreement if that failure is 
caused by “market conditions.”  Under the 
agreement, the Director of Economic 
Development determines whether market 
conditions caused the failure.  In making 
the determination, the Director must 
define market conditions in consultation 
with the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 
by considering whether the following has 
occurred: 
a) Two consecutive quarters of decline in 
manufacturing employment in Ohio as a 
whole or, when relevant, by 
manufacturing sector.  The Director must                         
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rely on employment figures reported by 
the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services. 
b) A decline, as a whole or by a relevant 
sector, in twelve of the last thirty six 
months as detailed in the Federal 
Reserve's national industrial production 
index. 
c) A decline within the relevant section of the 
Standard and Poor's "Industrial Outlook.45 
Include a notification provision 
All contracts should include a notice 
provision no matter how insignificant it 
may seem. Notification requires that the 
company alert the municipality and wider 
community to any changes in its 
operations, such as the initiation of any 
lawsuits or bankruptcy proceedings, which 
might adversely impact the subsidized 
project.  It also gives the economic 
development agency some time to rectify 
problems brought on by these changes – 
e.g., to find a new tenant for an abandoned 
facility, enlist the help of another developer 
to complete the project, or cushion layoffs 
with placement or retraining assistance. 
For example, a notice provision used by the 
Florida Qualified Tax Industry Program 
provides that: 
A corporation must notify the state of any 
developments that impact the agreement. 
These may include commencement and full 
implementation of the project, project delays 
and cancellation of the project.   
The Iowa New Jobs and Income Program 
Contract goes a step further toward better 
monitoring: 
The business shall provide prompt advance 
notice to the community and the department 
of any proposed change in the business 
ownership, structure or control which would 
materially affect the project. 
Clauses that require notice only in an event 
of a loan default or initiation of litigation 
should be avoided.  There are a number of 
other adverse events that could forewarn a 
substantial breach, and notice of these 
needs to be expressly provided for in the 
contract. 
Specify monitoring practices 
Monitoring is the key ingredient to 
ensuring compliance with incentive 
agreements.  Unfortunately, many local 
governments are not vigilant once an 
agreement has been made, often due to a 
lack of resources.  An investigative report 
of Ohio’s enterprise zone program, for 
example, found that no major city there 
routinely visited subsidized companies to 
monitor their compliance with legislated 
performance standards.46  One official in 
Kansas City noted that “We don't want to be 
big brother, peering over their shoulders all the 
time. . . We have tried to avoid the whole 
notion of ‘auditing’”.47  And even where 
attempts are made, subsidized firms are 
less than cooperative or timely. 
The public sector needs to do more on this 
front.  Without monitoring, the time and 
care that went into negotiating and 
drafting the agreement is worth little.  With 
the decision to give an abatement must 
also come the commitment to monitor 
compliance once it has been made.  And 
this commitment to monitor – including 
monitoring means and methodology – 





There are two common monitoring 
methods.  The first requires that specified 
documents be open to inspection and audit 
by the granting authority. Indianapolis, for 
example, requires a notarized annual 
report from its subsidized companies.  The 
city also conducts spot audits on about 5 
percent of subsidized companies, in which 
a company has 24 hours to respond to a 
series of questions about the number of 
employees, wages, and capital investment 
it has generated since the incentive was 
awarded. 
The second method is to impose an 
affirmative obligation on the part of the 
business to provide the necessary 
information.  This relieves often under-
resourced grantors from having to go out 
and actually gather the data.  Still, caution 
is necessary.  First, in the contract 
government officials need to be specific 
about the exact nature of the data desired.  
Second, they need to be aware that these 
requirements do not prevent a subsidy 
recipient from misrepresenting the facts.  
Businesses may provide their own 
interpretations of their employment and 
investment data.  Requesting the raw data 
helps avoid this scenario. 
Perhaps the best way to guard against such 
a possibility is to double check self-
reported data from subsidized businesses 
against labor market statistics collected by 
the public sector, preferably the state’s 
unemployment insurance records.  
Unemployment records, maintained by 
each state’s employment office, reflect not 
only new hires but also every employee 
and their wages each quarter.  Thus, they 
make for an ideal third-party-collected data 
set against which to verify retention and 
new hiring.  Kansas City checks self-
reported data against information derived 
from the city’s employee earnings tax.  It is 
easy for state and local economic 
development agencies to request this data 
and work together with state employment 
agencies to track the employment practices 
of subsidized firms. 
Legislation or contracts can also require 
companies to disclose deal-specific 
information to the general public.  
Minnesota’s Subsidy Reform law requires 
every recipient of an incentive to file an 
annual report specifying the amount of the 
incentive, the public purpose to be served, 
the number and quality of jobs to be 
generated, and any other special treatment 
received.  The law requires that each 
redevelopment agreement set measurable 
two-year goals and assess the corporation's 
progress.  Failure to meet the goals may 
result in the repayment of the tax break 
with interest.  The Minnesota Department 
of Employment and Economic 
Development (DEED) collects and publishes 
every disclosure report each June.  The 
reports are readily available to the public 
from DEED, which also publishes a brief 
summary of the data.  The disclosure form 
includes specific data on costs and 
benefits, including type of subsidy and its 
value, the number of jobs created, wages 
paid, and benefits provided, as well as 
other public purposes served by the deal.   
Amendments made to the Minnesota law in 
1999 are considered a model for 
transparency legislation and contain 
several improvements in the state's 
disclosure format, such as:  
• More detailed wage disclosure (instead 
of one aggregated average hourly 
figure, companies must report the wage 
for each new job within wage ranges). 
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• Health care disclosure (the company 
must disclose the sum of wages plus 
the hourly value of employer-paid 
health care, also in ranges, so that it 
will be obvious if the employer is 
providing health care and, if so, what 
its approximate value is). 
• Reporting on all subsidies the company 
has received from multiple agencies for 
a project. 
• Reporting on whether and from where 
the company was relocating and why 
the assisted project was not possible in 
the company’s previous location. 
• Provision of the name and address of 
the company’s parent corporation, so 
that the state will know if multiple 
subsidiaries of the same corporation 
are receiving subsidies. 
• Finally, the amended law sets forth 
penalties for companies that fail to 
report by March 1 of each year. If a 
company fails to report within 14 days 
after the granting agency sends a 
warning, the company must pay a fine 
of $100 a day up to a maximum of 
$1,000. All cities with a population of 
2,500 or more and all state agencies 
must file their reports with the state by 
April 1, and they must file a report even 
if it is only to say they had no 
reportable deals for the year.  The state 
must warn the agency, and if the 
agency fails to report by June 1, then 
the agency loses the right to enter into 
more deals until it complies. 
The state must include in its final report 
a list of companies that are ineligible to 
receive new subsidies because they 
have failed to achieve a goal in the last 
five years and have not paid back any of 
the original incentive. 
Other states, including Illinois, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Washington, 
Nebraska, and Maine have recently 
followed Minnesota’s example.48  Maine’s 
disclosure law requires that corporations 
receiving $10,000 or more in state 
assistance provide annual reports on total 
employment, job creation, and the wages 
and benefits of existing jobs and jobs 
created.49  The Economic Development 
Incentives Commission, created by the new 
law, was charged with studying the impact 
and cost-effectiveness of corporate 
subsidies and tax breaks and 
recommending reforms that will increase 
accountability. 
In addition to establishing breach, 
monitoring also allows third parties, such 
as community organizations and unions, to 
ensure that both the firm and the public 
sector are complying with the terms of the 
contract.  Four states, Illinois, Ohio, North 
Carolina, and Minnesota, now post relevant 
information on particular deals on the 
internet.  Connecticut requires that 
assisted companies make incentive reports 
available to employee representatives if 
they request them.50  Reporting 
requirements become especially important 
when a company is deciding to relocate, 
downsize or engage in any other form of 
restructuring because employee 
representatives can use the report in their 
own contract negotiations or publicize the 
company’s other obligations.  Employees 
can also assist municipalities in monitoring 
the firm’s behavior and applying additional 
pressure to adhere to the contract. 
The public interest in information, 
however, faces a countervailing business 
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interest in corporate confidentiality.  Many 
contracts have confidentiality clauses to 
protect “proprietary business information.”  
Public dealmakers should closely scrutinize 
blanket clauses that leave the public in the 
dark.   
Companies have legitimate interests in 
trade secrets, such as customer lists or 
profit-loss statements, which in the hands 
of a competitor could harm a business.51  
However, few subsidy applications, except 
perhaps business loans, require such 
information.  In other words, the kinds of 
data required for compliance monitoring in 
development agreements (e.g., 
employment levels, local capital 
expenditures and the like) is not likely to 
constitute proprietary business 
information.  The onus should be on the 
company to demonstrate how disclosure of 
the kind of data called for could 
disadvantage it with its competitors in 
order for it to be subject to confidentiality 
clauses. 
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SECTION THREE:  
PENALTIES FOR BREACH 
Contractual mechanisms must impose 
penalties on businesses that fail to live up 
to the promises made in exchange for 
incentives.  Specifying performance and 
disclosure requirements only solves part of 
the problem; ensuring compliance requires 
agreeing to penalties for noncompliance.   
A breach of contract should trigger a host 
of remedies and damages, many of which 
should be specifically laid out in the 
contract itself.  Penalties are particularly 
important when they are not specified in 
the enabling state statute or local 
ordinance.   Without guidance from 
contract language or statute, courts have 
the authority to decide what the damages 
should be. 
Opt for “back-loaded” incentives 
whenever possible 
Extensive penalty language is less 
important when municipalities and states 
structure incentives so that they pay out 
only when the company meets specified 
performance benchmarks.  The 
benchmarks can be laid out incrementally 
over time, releasing a specified amount of 
the incentive at each stage.  Doing so 
generally results in less need to recapture 
funds because of nonperformance further 
down the road.  By placing the burden on 
companies to prove that they have 
qualified for the incentives, public officials 
are freed from the responsibility of 
enforcing accountability provisions – a 
painful and litigious process.  Local 
governments find these kinds of incentives 
to be easy to use.  They are more politically 
palatable because the taxpayers are already 
enjoying the benefits from the project and 
are perceived to be “sharing” some of the 
increased tax revenues.52  
Tax increment financing (TIF) deals are 
often structured in this “pay-as-you-go” 
manner.  Such an arrangement means that 
a developer is reimbursed for the money 
spent on eligible TIF costs (e.g., 
demolition, parcel assembly, infrastructure 
development) by the municipality on an 
annual basis as tax increment revenues 
become available.  These kinds of TIF 
agreements have built in performance and 
enforcement controls.  The redevelopment 
agreement can be written so that in the 
event that a developer fails to make the 
needed investments, the municipality can 
withhold future payments. 
Each TIF redevelopment agreement 
negotiated by the City of Chicago contains 
as “Issuance of a Certificate of Completion” 
section.  It specifies that: 
the City has the right to terminate the 
Redevelopment Agreement, cease 
disbursement of City funds, and seek 
reimbursement from the development of 
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City funds if the project is not completed 
per the Redevelopment Agreement. 
In agreements that include the issuance of 
public notes or bonds, a provision is 
included allowing the City the right to seek 
reimbursement “provided that the City is 
entitled to rely on an opinion of counsel that 
such reimbursement will not jeopardize tax-
exempt status, if any, of the Bonds.” 
A provision in some of the City of Chicago’s 
redevelopment agreements states that if 
the developer fails to complete the project, 
the municipality has: 
the right (but not the obligation) to 
complete those TIF-funded improvements 
that are public improvements and to pay 
for the costs of TIF-funded improvements 
(including interest costs) out of City funds 
or other City monies.   In the event that 
the aggregate cost of completing the TIF-
funded improvements exceeds that 
amount of City funds available, the 
Developer shall reimburse the City for all 
reasonable costs and expenses incurred by 
the City in completing such TIF-funded 
improvements in excess of the available 
City funds….53 
Similarly, the Michigan Economic 
Development Training Grant uses an award 
schedule that only provides grant funds to 
the company as it meets certain program 
milestones.  The state assumes less of a 
risk for training workers by holding more 
of the funds until the program is 
completed. 
The use of this kind of structure, however, 
is not possible in all cases. Performance-
based incentives are less popular with 
businesses, many of whom prefer to 
receive lump sum payments to cover 
construction and other start-up costs.  
When a company has cash flow issues and 
needs funding up-front, they may not be 
willing to wait around until a government 
agency can evaluate performance 
measures.  However, if project costs are 
incurred and paid out over a longer period 




If public funds must change hands up front, 
nonperformance provisions must be 
written into the contract.  And even in the 
pay-as-you go context, one should carefully 
consider scenarios where a default could 
occur after a benchmark has been met.  For 
example, if a payment is tied to a specific 
level of employment being reached, what 
happens if, after the payment, the company 
discharges most of these new employees?  
Non-performance (or, more aptly here, 
undoing performance) provisions also 
make sense in this and many other pay-as-
you-go scenario. 
Non-performance provisions generally fall 
into five categories: 
• Rescission: canceling a subsidy 
agreement if job and revenue 
projections are not met; 
• Clawback: recovery of all or part of 
subsidy costs if performance goals are 
not met; 
• Recalibration: adjustment of subsidy to 
reflect changing business conditions; 
• Penalty: additional charges (e.g., the 
interest accrued on the public's 
investment) for non-performance or 
relocation; and 
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• Debarment and suspension: prohibiting 
the non-compliant company from 
receiving incentives in the future. 
Non-performance provisions should always: 
(a) state when the mechanism is triggered 
(i.e. the event that signals the breach); and 
(b) describe the penalty that will be 
exacted after a specified grace period. 
RESCISSION 
While it is a rare non-performance 
provision, rescission terminates the 
incentive agreement in the event of non-
performance.  Unfortunately, if rescission is 
the only remedy specified, companies can 
breach the agreement mid-stream in a way 
that leaves the granting agency little value 
for its money.  For example, rescission 
could allow a business to walk away from a 
development mid-stream, leaving nothing 
but a partially constructed project of little 
financial value.  Thus, in addition to 
rescission, it is always necessary to include 
other remedies.  The following is an 
example of a rescission provision from the 
Idaho Community Development Block 
Grant Program: 
The department shall have the right to 
terminate this contract in whole or in 
part, at any time before the date of 
completion, whenever it is determined the 
grantee has failed to comply with the 
conditions of the contract.  The 
department shall promptly notify the 
grantee in writing of the determination 
and the reasons for the termination and 
the effective date.   
CLAWBACKS 
 A “clawback” clause allows a grantor to 
take back previously conferred money or 
benefits upon a specified breach by the 
grant recipient.  Clawbacks can be tied to 
almost anything, including the number of 
employees, magnitude of capital 
investment, years in residence, or square 
footage of space developed.  Once the 
grant recipient fails to meet a benchmark  
in the contract, the clawback clause kicks 
in, entitling the grantor to repayment of 
the benefits conferred or other appropriate 
remedies.  For example, in its deal with 
Roll-Kraft, Inc., the city of Mentor, Ohio 
included the following clawback clause in 
its property tax abatement agreement: 
If Roll-Kraft materially fails to fulfill its 
obligations under this agreement, for 
reasons other than downturns of 
economic or business cycles, or if the City 
of Mentor determines that the 
certification as to delinquent taxes 
required by this agreement is fraudulent, 
the City of Mentor shall give at least 60 
days written notice thereof to Roll-Kraft.  
Roll-Kraft shall have the opportunity to 
cure such default within such period, but 
if such default is not cured within such 60 
day period, the City may terminate or 
modify the exemption from taxation 
granted under this agreement and may 
require the repayment of the amount of 
taxes that would have been payable had 
the property not been exempted from 
taxation under this agreement.54  
The City of Roanoke, Virginia ties the 
recapture to real estate: 
In the event the company fails to increase 
the square feet of occupancy by 20,000 
square feet, the company shall repay to 
the [agency] the amount of five dollars 
per square foot for each square foot of 
increase less than 20,000 square feet.55 
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Iowa ties the recapture to job creation: 
If the company fails to create and 
maintain the agreed number of jobs, it 
must repay a certain portion of the 
incentives it received depending on how 
well it has complied with the job creation 
goals.  The business is not liable for any 
amount if it meets more than 90% of its 
job creation obligations.  If the business 
has met less than 50% of its obligations, 
it must repay the same percentage in 
benefits as it fails to create in jobs.  If the 
business created more than 50 % but less 
than 75% of its requirement, the business 
must pay one half of the percentage in 
benefits as it failed to create in jobs.  If 
the business creates more than 75 % but 
less than 90%, it must pay one quarter of 
the percentage it failed to create in jobs.56 
The statutory guidelines for the Ohio Tax 
Credit Program tie recapture to the amount 
of time the company remains in the state: 
The maximum amount the authority can 
recapture depends on the amount of time 
the company remained at the project site: 
(1) If the company maintained operations 
at the location for one and one-half times 
the number of years of the term of the tax 
credit, up to 25% of the total allowed 
credits may be refunded;  (2) If it 
maintained operations for the term of the 
tax credit, the amount required to be 
refunded cannot exceed 50% of the 
allowed credits;  (3) If the company 
relocates operations within the term of 
the tax credit, the authority may require 
the company to refund  up to 100% of  
the allowed credits.57     
While these examples are illustrative, it 
should be noted that clawbacks can be tied 
to any conceivable contractual 
requirement.  What is critical is that each 
clawback remedy be tied to specific types 
or category of breaches and that the 
magnitude of the clawback has a reasonable 
connection to the magnitude of the breach.  
Courts are very reluctant to impose a 
remedy – even if contractually agreed to – 
that amounts to a huge windfall for one 
party and a huge penalty for the other. 
RECALIBRATIONS  
Recalibration provisions allow local 
governments to adjust the incentive to 
reflect changing business conditions.  With 
such modifications, the agreement does 
not need to be completely terminated if 
certain aspects of the relationship change.  
A contract may provide explicit provisions 
for making the recalibration request.  In 
Texas, a business may request a 
modification if: 
it is required to reduce or eliminate [its] 
work force because of 1) reductions in 
overall employment within an industry; 2) 
a substantial change in the skills required 
to continue the employer’s business exists 
because of technological changes; or 3) 
other reasonable factors, as determined 
by the executive director.58  
Unfortunately, when governments and 
firms agree to penalties that can be easily 
modified to fit contingencies, the penalties 
do not provide the same incentive to fulfill 
the contractual obligations. Still, 
recalibration clauses have their uses.  They 
are most common in low-interest loan 
programs.  Local governments have been 
able to raise the rate of their loans if the 
assisted company is not meeting the 
contractual obligations of the loan.            
A Pennsylvania program levies a penalty of 
two points over the prime rate if a 
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company is found to be out of compliance.  
An agency inspector can waive the penalty 
if the cause of the violation is reasonable, 
such as a general economic downturn.59 
DEBARMENT AND SUSPENSION 
Debarment provisions prohibit a company 
from ever doing further business with the 
public agency in the event of a breach.  
Suspension provisions are a similar bar but 
for a limited term.  The federal government 
has long used the threat of debarment to 
enforce its fair labor, health, and safety 
standards, and states have included similar 
provisions in their public works contracts.60   
State incentive programs may bar 
noncompliant firms from receiving any 
future subsidies from a particular program 
or from receiving any form of future 
assistance from the same state.  Such 
penalties, however, are less common at the 
local level.  In these matters, the courts 
tend to defer to the states so that the right 
to debar should be explicitly authorized by 
statute.61  In Minnesota, for example, 
THE INTEL DEAL  
The 1994 incentive agreement signed by 
the Intel Corporation and Washington 
County, Oregon and City of Hillsboro 
contained remedies for recovering 
public funds in the event that the 
company failed to comply with the 
provisions of the agreement for hiring 
and making service fee payments to the 
local governments. 
 
The following provisions are excerpted 
from the agreement: 
 
4.1.3.1. If, in any Hiring Year that such 
requirements apply, Intel fails to meet the 
job creation, retention and compensation 
requirements of Paragraphs 2.2.1 through 
2.2.4, Intel shall pay an amount equal to 
100% of the net property tax savings of 
the tax year containing the end of such 
Hiring Year. 
 
4.1.4. Intel may file an action in 
Washington County Circuit Court or 
Federal District Court for Oregon to 
contest this determination.  Payment of 
the amount in dispute shall be a 
precondition to contesting the notice of 
non-compliance.  County shall place the 
amount in dispute into a trust and agency 
account pending final resolution, with 
interest accruing to Intel at the rate 
earned if Intel prevails. 
 
If in any tax year, Intel fails to pay the 
community service fee required under 
paragraph 2.4, County may collect late 
payment penalty and interest on the 
delinquent CSF payment equal to the same 
penalty and interest as is charged by the 
County on all delinquent personal property 
accounts. In addition to any other remedy, 
failure to pay CSF by March 1 shall be 
basis for a finding of breach and non-
compliance, and shall require payment to 
the County of 100% of the net property tax 
savings for that tax year. 
 
Intel shall have the burden of documenting 
compliance with this Agreement.  Intel 
shall provide to the County such 
documentation or information as County 




companies that fail to pay their clawbacks 
are prohibited from obtaining any new 
subsidies in the state for five years from 
the date the breach was discovered.62 
Ask for attorneys’ fees, costs, and 
interest 
Even if a governmental unit, citizen’s 
group, or private party wins a case against 
a breaching corporation, it will not be 
made whole if it has to pay attorney’s fees 
and court costs out of its recovery.             
A contract provision requiring payment of 
fees and costs is a good hedge against this 
risk.  In the case of grants, municipalities 
can also request interest on funds used by 
the subsidized firm that might have 
otherwise been invested by the local 
government in an interest-bearing account.  
Because the validity of an attorneys’ fees 
clause varies from state to state, it would 
be wise to check state law before including 
such a provision. 
Familiarize yourself with other 
forms of damages and relief 
There are a number of different kinds of 
damages or relief available to local 
governments; they can be available as a 
general matter of contract law, by 
agreement of the parties, and according to 
specific legislation.  Unless the state 
enabling legislation provides that a remedy 
is to be exclusive, or the parties agree in 
the contract itself that this is the case, the 
grantor may be in a position to ask for 
specific performance or expectation, 
reliance, or restitution damages.  
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
In some circumstances, a local government 
may ask a court to make the assisted 
business keep its promise.  This kind of 
relief is referred to as “specific 
performance” and may take the form of a 
court order requiring some action, such as 
compliance with a minimum wage 
agreement or an injunction forbidding the 
company from closing its plant.  This 
remedy is available only when “the remedy 
at law is inadequate,” i.e., when monetary 
damages will not fully compensate the 
granting authority.  This could be the case 
when either (a) the value of the product or 
performance promised is so unique that 
money is no substitute or (b) monetary 
damages would be difficult or impossible 
to estimate. 63  A court will not order 
specific performance if that performance is 
impossible or unreasonably burdensome. 
In general, courts are very reluctant to 
compel specific performance of any type, 
let alone ordering the continued 
operations of a production facility. City and 
state officials can anticipate this preference 
when drafting contracts by specifying 
monetary damages, the threat of which 
may compel the desired behavior. 
EXPECTATION DAMAGES 
These damages are intended to place the 
injured party in the position it would have 
been in had the other party kept its 
promise.  When local governments provide 
incentives to private firms for new jobs, 
they expect that those jobs will materialize 
and that individuals holding the positions 
will purchase goods and services within the 
jurisdiction.  If a municipality has 
conducted cost-benefit analysis before the 
incentive changed hands, it would have an 
estimate of the value of the anticipated 
public benefits that could be awarded to 
the slighted jurisdiction.64  The government 
agency may also find itself in a position to 
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recover lost taxes and other public benefits 
that it expected.  If the assisted firm has 
committed to keeping emissions to a 
specified minimum level and does not, it 
might be sued for the reasonable cost of 
reducing pollution to that level. 
Courts, however, are reluctant to award 
damages that are too speculative.  
Therefore, the more comprehensive and 
detailed the cost-benefit analysis, the 
better chance a local government has of 
recovering expectation damages.  
Moreover, courts will only award this kind 
of damages if they are “foreseeable” in that 
at the time of the agreement, the parties 
likely foresaw that the damages would 
occur in event of a breach.  Conducting the 
cost-benefit analysis up front and making 
the expected benefits part of the 
agreement helps resolve this forseeability 
issue in favor of the grantor. 
RELIANCE DAMAGES 
These damages are not intended to reflect 
the benefit expected but instead the extent 
to which the injured party suffered losses 
while acting in reasonable reliance on a 
promise that was broken.  In other words, 
the goal of reliance damages is to put a 
party in the position it would have been 
had the promise never been made.  This 
means that costs incurred before the 
agreement was reached are not 
recoverable.  These damages tend to be 
lower in amount than expectation damages 
because a rational granting agency will only 
offer an incentive package if the expected 
benefits outweigh the potential costs.65 
Reliance damages are easier to recover 
than expectation damages because they 
are, generally, less vague.  In theory, if 
accurate records are kept of expenditures 
reliance damages are easier to quantify 
than expectation damages.  In addition to 
the value of the inducement, municipalities 
can ask for the interest that would have 
accrued on the incentive if it had not been 
disbursed, the costs associated with an 
ancillary investment in infrastructure for 
the project, and the legal and 
administrative costs incurred for the 
project.  Though more difficult to measure, 
the social costs that accrue to the 
municipality because of business relocation 
(e.g., retraining employees, taking a loss on 
property transferred to the municipality) 
may also be requested, though because of 
their less concrete nature, they are less 
likely to be awarded by a court. 
RESTITUTION AND LIQUIDATED DAMAGES 
“Clawback” clauses can embody the 
principles of restitution damages and 
liquidated damages.  Restitution damages 
reflect the benefit the local government 
conferred upon the non-performing 
business minus the portion of the benefits 
the business conferred on the government. 
The point is to prevent unjust enrichment, 
i.e., one party benefiting at the other's 
expense.  In most cases, the amount is 
equal to the economic development 
expenditure (i.e., the property taxes abated 
or market value of a land write-down) less 
the value of whatever lasting investment 
the business made. 
Liquidated damages are damages agreed 
upon in the event of a specified breach.  
Generally, such contractual provisions are 
enforceable if three criteria are met: (a) the 
injury due to breach is uncertain or difficult 
to quantify; (b) the value of the damages 
reasonably approximates the probable loss; 
and (c) the damages are not designed to 
deter or punish a breach.  If the value of an 
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inducement to the local government is $30 
million, but the contract provision provides 
for damages of $60 million, it will not be 
enforced even if the parties intended to be 
bound.  However, if enabling legislation 
governing the inducement allows or 
requires a penalty so denominated, it may 
override normal contract law.66  Whether 
such a statutory provision is valid will 
depend on applicable state law, which 
varies from state to state. 
The key point here is that clearly designed 
and drafted clawback clauses can help 
avoid litigation.  When a subsidized 
business is faced with clear penalties for its 
failure to comply with the requirements of 
an incentive package, it should make 
financial sense for it to comply within the 
terms negotiated. 
Include a waiver provision 
All contracts should contain a waiver 
provision to protect the public sector from 
losing its rights under the contract if it 
delays enforcement.  Economic 
development agencies often hold off 
enforcing incentive contracts, attempting 
other non-legal means to get the non-
performing business to honor its promises.  
It is also possible that a new administration 
may wish to enforce conditions where its 
predecessor did not.67  Without a waiver 
clause, these delays could be interpreted as 
a waiver of the breach by the granting 
agency.  A waiver clause could read: “No 
failure to insist on the prompt performance by 
the company of its obligations under the 
agreement shall be construed as a waiver by 
the department of its rights under the 
contract.” 
 
Seek support from community 
organizations 
Grassroots campaigns and negative press 
can complement measures that local 
governments take to enforce contracts.  
Community groups have organized an 
increasing number of petition drives and 
referenda to place subsidies and 
performance measures on local ballots. 
Their power lies in their ability to raise 
community awareness of the deal terms, 
which may shame companies into better 
behavior.  For example, after local 
organizations complained publicly of a deal 
gone bad, ABB Instrumentation announced 
that it would give back $1.1 million to the 
Monroe County (New York) Industrial 
Development Authority when it failed to 
create the agreed-upon number of jobs. 
Coalitions of community groups have been 
involved in similar kinds of efforts to 
obtain what are called Community Benefits 
Agreements (CBA) from assisted developers 
and businesses.68  A CBA is a legally 
enforceable contract signed by community 
organizations and developers.  In it the 
developer agrees to provide certain 
benefits and the community organizations 
promise support for the project that will 
aid in the developer’s dealings with those 
government agencies responsible for 
permitting, zoning, and financing the new 
development.  It is typically negotiated 
before the actual incentive agreement, but 
can be incorporated into it if all parties 
agree. 
In May of 2001, a coalition of labor and 
community-based organizations – the 
Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic 
Justice – negotiated a landmark CBA for the 
Los Angeles Sports and Entertainment 
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District development, a massive mixed-use 
project located next to the Staples Center 
sports arena.  Among other things, the CBA 
required the developer to: 
• Provide an assessment of community 
park and recreation needs, and a 
commit $1 million toward meeting 
those needs; 
• Increase the proportion of affordable 
housing in the residential unit mix and 
provide seed money for additional 
affordable units; 
• Provide parking for the adjacent 
residential area; 
• Assure that 70% of the jobs created in 
the project would pay the City’s living 
wage; and 
• Agree to consultation with the coalition 
on selection of tenants. 
Formally requiring some sort of public 
participation in the process from the start 
allows such groups to gain a sense of 
ownership over the deal and can lead to a 
complementary CBA.   
In some places, taxpayers have demanded 
that subsidies be subject to the community 
approval.  Wisconsin requires a voter 
referenda if a portion of the electorate 
seeks to challenge the subsidy: 
The governing body may issue bonds 
under this section without submitting the 
proposition to the electors of the 
municipality for approval unless within 
30 days from the date of publication or 
notice of adoption of the initial resolution 
for such bonds, a petition, signed by not 
less than 5% of the registered electors of 
the municipality is filed with the clerk of 
the municipality requesting a referendum 
upon the question of the issuance of the 
bonds.  If such a petition is filed, the 
bonds shall not be issued until approved 
by a majority of the electors of the 
municipality voting thereon at a general 
or special election.69 
Moreover, legislation can provide for a 
private right of enforcement by third 
parties to the contract.  This would allow 
private citizens, unions, and community 
groups legal standing to sue a business 
that violates the law.  Without such 




Anecdotal evidence suggests that cities and 
states are becoming more assertive in their 
incentive negotiations with business.  
Approximately half of the major cities and 
states in the Midwest have successfully 
enforced at least one clawback clause in 
the last 5 years.70  Indianapolis was the 
front runner, having found 30 companies 
to be out of compliance since 1993--the 
year in which it established job goals and 
wage standards for all business incentive 
programs.  For example, Indianapolis 
signed a deal with United Airlines giving it 
about $300 million in tax breaks for a new 
maintenance hub at the Indianapolis 
International Airport.71  In return the airline 
made two promises: to invest $800 million 
by the end of 2001 and to create at least 
6,300 full-time jobs by the end of 2004. 
When United failed to meet its first 
promise, it agreed to pay $31 million to 
Indiana government agencies in prorated 
clawback fines.72 
 
Other cities have followed suit.  For 
example, in September 2002 the Kansas 
City redevelopment agency sued Aquila 
Merchant Services Inc. to recapture tax 
incentives it had awarded the business.73 
The suit claimed that the company violated 
an agreement to employ at least 400 
workers downtown, and in doing so 
activated a clawback designed to reimburse 
the incentives.  Aquila quickly settled the 
case by returning $1.57 million in tax 
abatements to the agency. 
 
Although using performance standards is 
certainly better than giving away subsidies 
for free, local governments still draft 
contracts too loosely and enforce them too 
weakly to substantially increase the return 
on the public’s investment.  Or economic 
development practitioners give up before 
they start.  They figure that even when they 
write excellent contracts, there is no 
guarantee that businesses will stick to their 
promises. 
 
Defeatism is no excuse for ignoring the 
public’s investment in economic 
development.  Nor is the fear that many 
practitioners have of developing a 
reputation for “aggressive” and “anti-
business” behavior.  Local officials are 
often concerned that these contractual 
mechanisms lower the value of the 
incentive for the company if the company 
perceives future tussles with the law, a lack 
of flexibility on the part of the public 
sector, and additional reporting 
requirements and compliance costs. 
 
Research has revealed that such fears are 
likely overstated.74  If firms are aware of 
accountability provisions from the start of 
negotiations, formalizing the quid pro quo 
in a contract can actually clarify the 
CONCLUSION 
37 
THE IDEAL DEAL 
expectations of both parties, reducing the 
uncertainty and potential for arbitrary 
behavior that plagues incentives.  If 
accountability mechanisms are clear and 
reasonable, firms may voluntarily repay the 
incentive if they renege on their promises, 
obviating the need for any formal legal 
enforcement. 
 
Moreover, if more municipalities and states 
adopt these kinds of contractual provisions 
as normal practice, individual governments 
cannot claim that accountability 
mechanisms hamper their ability to 
compete for business relative to those that 
do not regulate incentives. 
 
This handbook has stressed the importance 
of contractual provisions in protecting 
public interests.  The following box 
displays selected model legislative 
language drafted by Good Jobs First that 
can be adopted for use in specific contracts 
and municipal ordinances.  It brings 
together several of the main areas of 
emphasis in this handbook: performance 
standards, monitoring provisions, and 
enforcement mechanisms. 
 
Our hope is that by including these kinds 
of legal provisions, practitioners can both 
perform better in negotiations with 
companies seeking subsidies and also 
monitor and enforce these agreements 
after the incentives have changed hands. 
Without such protections, the fiscal health 





MODEL DEAL LEGISLATION:  
THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT 
Good Jobs First has drafted model legislation, 
several sections of which are excerpted here: 
SEC. 7 SUBSIDY LIMIT AND JOB QUALITY STANDARDS  
a. A granting body shall not grant award a 
development subsidy if the cost per job is 
greater than $35,000.00. Such cost shall be 
determined by dividing the amount of the 
subsidy by the number of full-time jobs required 
under the application approved by the granting 
body. 
b. A granting body shall not grant a subsidy to an 
applicant unless the wages paid to employees at 
the project site are equal to or exceed 85% of 
the average wage as established under 
paragraphs (12) and (13) of section 5, provided, 
however, that for small businesses, the average 
wage must equal or exceed 75% of the wages 
established thereunder. The computation of 
wages under this section shall only apply to a 
recipient corporation that provides the health 
care coverage as approved in its application by 
the granting body.  
SEC. 8 RECAPTURE  
a. A recipient corporation shall fulfill its job 
creation, wage, health care and other benefit 
requirements for the project site within two 
years of the date of subsidy. Such recipient shall 
maintain its wage and benefit goals as long as 
the subsidy is in effect, or five years, whichever 
is longer.  
b. The corporate parent of a recipient corporation 
must maintain at least 90% of its employment in 
the State as long as the development subsidy is 
in effect, or not less than five years, whichever 
is longer.  
c. If the requirements under paragraphs (a) or (b) 
are not fulfilled , the granting body shall 
recapture the development subsidy from the 
recipient corporation as follows:   
Upon a failure by the recipient corporation to 
create the required number of jobs or to pay 
the required wages or benefits, the amount 
recaptured shall be based on the pro rata 
amount by which the unfulfilled jobs, wages or 
benefits bear to the total amount of the 
development subsidy. Upon a failure of the 
corporate parent to maintain 90% of its 
employment in the State, the rate of recapture 
shall equal twice the percentage by which such 
employment is less than 90%. 
d. The granting body shall provide notice to the 
recipient corporation of its intent to recapture 
the development subsidy and state the reasons 
and amount to be recaptured. The recipient 
corporation shall remit to the governing body 
such amount within 60 calendar days of the 
date of such notice.   
e. If a recipient corporation defaults on a 
development subsidy in three consecutive 
calendar years, the granting body shall declare 
the subsidy null and void, and shall so notify the 
Department of Development and the recipient 
corporation. The recipient corporation shall pay 
back to the granting body all remaining value of 
the development subsidy it has not previously 
repaid within 180 calendar days of the date of 
the notice of such default.  
SEC. 9 PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT ACTION  
If a granting body fails to enforce any provision of 
this Act, any individual who paid personal income 
taxes to the State in the calendar year prior to the 
year in dispute, or any organization representing 
such taxpayers, shall be entitled to bring a civil 
action in state court to compel enforcement under 
this statute. The court shall award reasonable 
attorney’s fees and costs to such prevailing 
taxpayer or organization.  
SEC. 10 PUBLIC RECORD DISCLOSURE 
All records required to be prepared or maintained 
under this Act, including but not limited to 
applications, progress reports, recapture notices 
and any other records or proceedings relating 
thereto, shall be subject to disclosure under the 
State's Open Records Act.  
SEC. 11 SEPARABILITY  
If any provision of this Act is determined to be 
unenforceable in a court of law, such 
determination shall not affect the validity or 
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